Copyright and the Perfect Curve by Cohen, Julie E.
Georgetown University Law Center 
Scholarship @ GEORGETOWN LAW 
2000 
Copyright and the Perfect Curve 
Julie E. Cohen 
Georgetown University Law Center, jec@law.georgetown.edu 
 
 
This paper can be downloaded free of charge from: 
https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub/59 
 
53 Vand. L. Rev. 1799-1819 (2000) 
This open-access article is brought to you by the Georgetown Law Library. Posted with permission of the author. 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub 
 Part of the Intellectual Property Law Commons, and the Law and Economics Commons 
GEORGETOWN LAW 
Faculty Publications 
 
 
 
 
 
 
January 2010 
 
 
 
Copyright and the Perfect Curve 
 
 
 
 
53 Vand. L. Rev. 1799-1819 (2000) 
                            
 
Julie E. Cohen 
                                                     Professor of Law 
Georgetown University Law Center 
jec@law.georgetown.edu 
 
This paper can be downloaded without charge from: 
Scholarly Commons:  http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub/59/ 
SSRN:  http://ssrn.com/abstract=240590 
 
Posted with permission of the author 
Copyright and the Perfect Curve
Julie E. Cohen*
I. THE "PROGRESS" PROBLEM .............................................. 1799
II. THE CONTRACTUAL PRICE DISCRIMINATION MODEL ......... 1801
III. COPYRIGHT AND THE QUALITY OF "PROGRESS" ................. 1808
IV. MODELING UNPREDICTABILITY ........................................ 1814
V. CONCLUSION .................................................................... 1819
I. THE "PROGRESS" PROBLEM
Everyone agrees that the purpose of the copyright system is
to promote progress.' At the same time, though, skepticism about
the law's ability to define the substance of progress runs deep
within copyright case law and theory. Legal decisionmakers and
scholars have quite properly doubted their own ability to evaluate
artistic or literary merit, and have worried that efforts to do so
would result in an inappropriately elitist and conservative stan-
dard.2 In addition, there is room for substantial debate about
* Associate Professor, Georgetown University Law Center. A.B. 1986, Harvard-Radcliffe;
J.D. 1991, Harvard. Email: jec@law.georgetown.edu. I thank the participants in Taking Stock:
The Law and Economics of Intellectual Property Rights for their helpful comments, and espe-
cially thank J.H. Reichman for organizing the conference and inviting me to participate. ) 2000,
Julie E. Cohen. Permission is hereby granted for copies of this essay to be made and distributed
for educational use, provided that: (i) copies are distributed at or below cost; (ii) the author and
the Vanderbilt Law Review are identified; and (iii) proper notice of copyright is affixed to each
copy.
1. The Constitution says so, after all. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (authorizing Con-
gress to grant patents and copyrights "[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts").
2. For the most famous statement of this principle, see Bleistein v. Donaldson Litho-
graphing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251-52 (1902); see also Amy B. Cohen, Copyright Law and the Myth
of Objectivity: The Idea-Expression Dichotomy and the Inevitability of Artistic Value Judgments,
66 IND. L.J. 175, 177, 184-95, 230-32 (1990) (summarizing the case for objectivity and arguing
1799
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whether the metaphor of forward motion leaves out other important
measures of what "progress" is or might be.3
This agnosticism about prospects for value-neutrality has led
copyright law and scholarship to eschew debates about the sub-
stance of progress in favor of debates about rule structures for ena-
bling progress. Steeped in jurisprudential and scientific traditions
that prize process and method, both in themselves and as proxies
for value-neutral decisionmaking, we have decided that even if we
cannot say what progress is, we can say something about the sys-
tem of rules and entitlements that is most likely to promote it. This
strategy, though, assumes that the substance of progress is inde-
pendent of the legal structure designed to produce it. If it is not-if
entitlement structures play a role in determining the kinds of new
works that will be produced-then we cannot escape making deci-
sions about substance, and it is folly to pretend otherwise.
This Essay argues that the assumption that "progress" is
qualitatively independent of the underlying entitlement structure is
wrong. In particular, I shall argue that a shift to a copyright rule
structure based on highly granular, contractually enforced "price
discrimination" would work a fundamental shift, as well, in the na-
ture of the progress produced. The critique of the contractual price
discrimination model, moreover, exposes deep defects in the use of
neoclassical "law and economics" methodology to solve problems
relating to the incentive structure of copyright law. What is needed,
instead, is an economic model of copyright that acknowledges the
central role of unpredictability in the creative process.
Part II introduces the contractual price discrimination model
and critically examines the premises on which it is based. Part III
considers the larger institutional and distributional implications of
a shift to contractual price discrimination. It argues that the cur-
rent system of imperfect controls produces important public bene-
fits-important substantive components of "progress"-that the
contractual price discrimination model does not accurately value
that decisions about copyrightability necessarily rest on value judgments); Monroe E. Price &
Malla Pollack, The Author in Copyright- Notes for the Literary Critic, 10 CARDoZO ARTS & ENT.
L.J. 703, 711-12 (1992) (considering the strengths and weaknesses of the objective approach to
determining authorship); Alfred C. Yen, Copyright Opinions and Aesthetic Theory, 71 S. CAL. L.
REV. 247 (1998) (showing that judges in copyright cases do in fact make judgments about artistic
merit, and arguing that these judgments and the standards that inform them should be ex-
pressly acknowledged).
3. See generally Margaret Chon, Postmodern "Progress"' Reconsidering the Copyright and
Patent Power, 43 DEPAUL L. REV. 97 (1993) (comparing modern and postmodern ideas of prog-
ress).
[Vol. 53:6:17991800
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and would not itself produce to the same extent. Part IV concludes
that the need to preserve these benefits, which stem from the in-
herent complexity and unpredictability of the creative process, re-
quires both a very different structure for copyright law and a very
different approach to the task of constructing economic models.
II. THE CONTRACTUAL PRICE DISCRIMINATION MODEL
Copyright law conceives and promotes progress in two dis-
tinct but related ways: First, it seeks to increase both the quantity
and quality of creative output. Second, it seeks to broaden public
access to creative works.4 Advocates of the contractual price dis-
crimination model argue that it is superior to the traditional copy-
right framework on both measures. This Part examines these ar-
guments, and identifies important areas of uncertainty in the
model's empirical and predictive claims.
The two "progress" goals exist in substantial tension with
one another. The incentives that copyright law supplies to authors
operate by restricting public access to and use of creative works.
More specifically, the access restrictions enable copyright owners to
charge prices above the marginal cost of producing additional copies
of their works. The result is that there are consumers who want to
purchase copies of the work, but are only willing (or able) to do so at
a price lower than the monopoly price but higher than the work's
marginal cost. Scholars have termed this effect-represented by
Area 3 in Figure A, below-the "deadweight loss" created by copy-
right law.5 To the extent that the widespread public availability of
4. The access criterion follows from the constitutional mandate to promote progress, both
because "progress" is of little value unless its fruits are made available to the public, and because
knowledge is cumulative, so that the public availability of creative works promotes further prog-
ress. See, e.g., Niva Elkin-Koren, Copyright Policy and the Limits of Freedom of Contract, 12
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 93, 98-101 (1997); Robert A. Kreiss, Accessibility and Commercialization in
Copyright Theory, 43 UCLA L. REV. 1, 10-14 (1995); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An
Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325, 326-27 (1989); Mark A. Lemley,
The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75 TEX. L. REV. 989, 993-99 (1997);
Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965 (1990). But see Glynn S. Lunney, Jr.,
Reexamining Copyright's Incentives-Access Paradigm, 49 VAND. L. REV. 483, 487-88, 589-99
(1996) (arguing that in evaluating the success of a copyright regime, society also should consider
the opportunity cost it creates, measured in terms of other, non-creative activities that might
produce greater social welfare).
5. See, e.g., Elkin-Koren, supra note 4, at 99-100; William W. Fisher III, Property and Con-
tract on the Internet, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1203, 1235-36 (1998); see generally Landes & Posner,
supra note 4 (offering the original version of this analysis). For ease of reference, in both Figure
A and Figure B, infra, I have used the same system of notation employed by Fisher in his recent
treatment of the contractual price discrimination model.
2000] 1801
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creative works promotes shared aspects of the general welfare, this
deadweight loss represents both a failure to satisfy individual pref-
erences and public benefit foregone.
Figure A: Economic Effects of First Sale Under Copyright
$
nsumer surplus
Monopoly profits
2 Deadweight loss (foregone
consumer surplus)
"***E Marginal Cost
Z
0 Profit-maximizing output Quantity
To ameliorate the incentives/access tradeoff, a number of
economically oriented thinkers have advocated the use of contrac-
tually enforced "price discrimination"-charging different rates to
different consumers, and prohibiting transfers that would allow
consumers to engage in arbitrage.6 They envision a version of price
discrimination under which the different prices will reflect access of
varying quantity and/or quality.7 (I shall refer to this proposal as
6. For a concise explanation of price discrimination and its requirements, see Michael J.
Meurer, Price Discrimination, Personal Use, and Piracy: Copyright Protection of Digital Works,
45 BuFF. L. REV. 845, 869-76 (1997).
7. See, e.g., Tom W. Bell, Fair Use vs. Fared Use The Impact of Automated Rights Man-
agement on Copyright's Fair Use Doctrine, 76 N.C. L. REV. 557, 589 n.142 (1998); Fisher, su-
pra note 5 at 1234-52; David Friedman, In Defense of Private Orderings: Comments on Julie
Cohen's "Copyright and the Jurisprudence of Self-Help", 13 BERKELEY TECH. LJ. 1151, 1168-71
(1998); Maureen A. O'Rourke, Copyright Preemption After the ProOD Case: A Market-Based
Approach, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 53, 62, 70-71 (1997); see also Yannis Bakos, et al., Shared
Information Goods, 42 J.L. & ECON. 117, 119-48 (1999) (assuming that this sort of price dis-
crimination is desirable and exploring whether small-group sharing of information goods pro-
motes or frustrates efficient price discrimination); Harold S. Demsetz, The Private Production of
Public Goods, 13 J.L. & EcoN. 293, 295-306 (1970) (advocating price discrimination as a tool for
enabling the private production of information goods). Fisher advances a modified price dis-
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"contractual price discrimination.") The proposal mirrors emerging
market practices. Increasingly, information goods are "versioned"
for buyers with different needs and resources.8 Thus, evaluating the
contractual price discrimination model's progress claims is impor-
tant for practical as well as theoretical reasons.
The argument that contractual price discrimination will fur-
ther copyright's dissemination goal is straightforward: Allowing
monopolists to employ contractual price discrimination will promote
consumer welfare, and ensure broader public distribution of crea-
tive works, by guaranteeing lower prices.9 The virtue of contractual
price discrimination is that it replaces a single price with a range of
prices. This enables lower-income consumers to purchase access-
albeit of lower quality-that they could not otherwise afford.
As to the effects of contractual price discrimination on crea-
tive progress, conventional economic wisdom holds that replacing a
single price with a range of prices also will allow the copyright
owner to appropriate a greater percentage of the consumer surplus
attached to a particular work. This, in turn, will strengthen exist-
ing incentives for creation.10 For example, the copyright owner
might charge higher rates for access to users who want to improve
on (or compete with) the work in some way. The incentive effects for
follow-on improvers are not forgotten, however. The conventional
economic wisdom holds that rational copyright owners will license
improvements (and also access) at prevailing market rates, and
that market competition among copyright owners will keep rates
reasonable."I
crimination model that incorporates some compulsory terms designed to serve the public inter-
est. His proposal is considered more fully in Part IV, infra.
8. See CARL SHAPIRO & HAL R. VARIAN, INFORMATION RULES: A STRATEGIC GUIDE TO THE
NETWORK ECONOMY 53-81 (1999).
9. See Bell, supra note 7, at 561; Fisher, supra note 5, at 1237-40; Friedman, supra note 7,
at 1169-70; O'Rourke, supra note 7, at 62, 70-71.
10.See, e.g., Fisher, supra note 5, at 1237-39; Friedman, supra note 7, at 1169; Trotter Hardy,
Property (and Copyright) in Cyberspace, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 217, 254-58; see also Meurer,
supra note 6, at 877-80 (explaining how price discrimination can raise profits for copyright own-
ers).
I1.See, e.g., Bell, supra note 7, at 587-90, 601-08; Robert P. Merges, The End of Friction?
Property Rights and Contract in the "Newtonian" World of On-Line Commerce, 12 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 115, 120-28 (1997) [hereinafter Merges, End of Friction]; O'Rourke, supra note 7, at
80-87; see also Robert P. Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights
and Collective Rights Organizations, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1293, 1328 (1996) [hereinafter Merges,
Liability Rules] (arguing that the licenses developed by voluntarily constituted collective rights
organizations will be "closely akin" to compulsory licenses); see generally Lemley, supra note 4, at
1044-47 (delineating the argument that the market will promote creative progress by allocating
improvement rights to those who value them most highly).
20001 1803
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The result of contractual price discrimination, according to
its advocates, will be a system that is better for everyone. As Figure
B illustrates, under contractual price discrimination there will be
far less deadweight loss. At the other end of the demand curve, the
gap between price and consumer surplus will shrink. The affected
individuals, though, will still be getting the work at prices they are
willing to pay. And everyone will benefit-or so the account goes-
from the increased creative output that the ability to charge higher
prices will guarantee.
Figure B: Economic Effects of Contractual Price Discrimination
$
Consumer surplus
Monopoly profits
. Marginal cost
Quantity
0 Deadweight loss
For the contractual price discrimination model to work,
though, copyright owners need to be able to change some of the
ground rules set by copyright law. Effective price discrimination
requires restrictions on transfer of the work to other users; price
discrimination will not work if high-value arbitrageurs can obtain
low-cost access from redistributors. 12 Copyright law, in contrast,
allows the owner to control only the first sale of the work, and
places no restrictions on the rental or lending of most works.13
Thus, we would need to allow copyright owners to opt out of the
first sale doctrine, and to set and enforce restrictions on transfer of
12.See Meurer, supra note 6, at 874-76.
13.See 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (1996); see also id. § 109(b) (restricting the rental or lending of
computer software and sound recordings).
1804 [Vol. 53:6:1799
HeinOnline -- 53 Vand. L. Rev.  1804 2000
20001 COPYRIGHTAND THE PERFECT CURVE 1805
works to other users. In addition, since reuse privileges are a factor
in determining the quality of access, we would need to allow copy-
right owners the freedom to contract around copyright limitations
such as the idea-expression distinction or the fair use doctrine if
this would help lower prices for some users.' 4
In short, a cornerstone of the contractual price discrimina-
tion model is that the statutory scheme of copyright must be con-
sidered simply a system of default rules that may be changed by
contract. A growing body of copyright scholarship supports these
modifications. 15 Proponents range from the major copyright indus-
tries, which want more protection than current copyright law alone
can provide, to libertarian thinkers, who believe that contract is
more flexible and more responsible to individual preferences than a
standardized, legislative copyright regime.16
Whether we should treat traditional copyright rules as mere
defaults, though, depends on whether the conventional economic
14.See Bell, supra note 7, at 561, 588-89; O'Rourke, supra note 7, at 62, 70-71; see also
Fisher, supra note 5, at 1241-52 (endorsing this view but arguing that the law should preserve
certain exceptions); Merges, End of Friction, supra note 11, at 134-35 (same); Maureen A.
O'Rourke, Fencing Cyberspace: Drawing Borders in a Virtual World, 82 MINN. L. REV. 609, 695-
96 (1998) [hereinafter O'Rourke, Fencing Cyberspace] (approving Merges' approach for Internet
hyperlinks). Important copyright limitations include 17 U.S.C. §§ 102(b) (1996) (excluding from
copyright protection ideas, methods of operation, and the like), 107 (fair use doctrine), 108
(copying privileges for libraries), 109(a) (first sale doctrine), 110 (public performance and display
exemptions for nonprofit activities and organizations). See also Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural
Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 349-50 (1991) (holding that the denial of copyright protection
for facts is constitutionally compelled).
15.See Bell, supra note 7, at 617; Tom W. Bell, Exit from Copyright: Market Success vs. Statu-
tory Failure in the Protection of Expressive Works (working paper Apr. 30, 2000) (on file with
author); Friedman, supra note 7, at 1155; Hardy, supra note 10, at 224; Merges, Liability Rules,
supra note 11, at 1347; O'Rourke, supra note 7, at 62, 70-71; see also Merges, Liability Rules,
supra note 11, at 1328 (predicting that under a regime of more complete entitlements, copyright
owners will develop efficient collective institutions for valuing, managing, and licensing their
rights); see generally Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Eco-
nomic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 87-91 (1989) (summarizing literature and dis-
cussing economic rationales for allowing parties to treat initial rules as defaults that may be
varied).
16.Compare Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, The License is the Product: Comments on the Promise
of Article 2B for Software and Information Licensing, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 891, 903 (1998)
(arguing that the software and information industries need the flexibility to configure licenses
according to emerging business models), and Raymond T. Nimmer, Breaking Barriers: The Rela-
tion Between Contract and Intellectual Property Law, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 827, 878 (1998)
(contending that intellectual property law generally presumes freedom of contract for intellectual
property owners), with PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT'S HIGHWAY: THE LAW AND LORE OF
COPYRIGHT FROM GUTENBERG TO THE CELESTIAL JUKEBOx 216-17 (1994) (advocating the exten-
sion of licensing because it will increase incentives for authors and make information markets
more responsive to consumer preferences), and Bell, supra note 7, at 607-08 (asserting that leg-
islatively decreed limitations on copyright scope "epitomize the kind of take-it-or-leave-it offer
that foes of adhesion contracts so dislike").
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interpretation of the demand curve is right. To summarize, that
interpretation assumes that areas 2 and 3 under the demand curve
in Figure A represent wasted opportunities to make copyright law
more efficient, both distributively and productively. If so, it follows
that the highest and best function of a hybrid copyright-contract
regime should be to allow copyright owners to capture as much of
the area under the demand curve as possible, thus (as in Figure B)
making the correspondence between demand and distribution
curves more perfect. There are, however, other possible readings of
Figure A. It is important to understand what they are, in order to
understand the choice that contractual price discrimination poses.
Turning first to distributional considerations, Area 3 in Fig-
ure A represents an absolute distributional shortfall only if we ig-
nore the social institutions enabled by copyright law that tradition-
ally have provided lower-income consumers with alternative means
of access to works that they cannot afford to purchase outright. 17 As
Wendy Gordon reminds us, second-hand markets and public i-
braries also are methods of price discrimination that allow lower-
cost but less convenient access to copyrighted materials. 18 Moreo-
ver, a rule allowing monopolists to price discriminate is not the only
sort of rule that will reduce prices; competition against the tradi-
tional copyright backdrop of limited entitlements might produce the
same result.19
The conventional reading of the demand and distribution
curves under traditional copyright pricing reflects neither the util-
ity realized by lower-income individuals who gain access through
these alternative institutions nor the resulting increase in overall
social welfare. Figures A and B measure only the copyright owner's
ability to make a first sale to a particular consumer under different
pricing (and legal) regimes. While it is clear that contractual price
discrimination would make copyright owners better off, the welfare
implications for lower-income individuals and for society generally
are more debatable. 20 Because Figures A and B offer no way of
17.See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. §§ 108 (1996) (establishing copying privileges for libraries), 109 (limit-
ing the copyright owner's exclusive right to control distribution of the work to the first sale of
copies for most works).
18.See Wendy J. Gordon, Intellectual Property as Price Discrimination: Implications for
Copyright, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1367, 1372-75, 1388 (1998); cf. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 16, at 8
(illustrating the sorts of price discrimination currently practiced by copyright owners).
19.See Gordon, supra note 18, at 1388-89.
20.See Julie E. Cohen, Lochner in Cyberspace: The New Economic Orthodoxy of 'Rights Man-
agement", 97 MICH. L. REV. 462, 498-99, 542-51 (1998) (discussing difference between private
and social welfare, both generally and in the particular context of information markets).
1806 [Vol. 53:6:1799
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evaluating these implications, they are insufficient basis for con-
cluding that contractual price discrimination represents an overall
improvement.
As to the incentives argument offered by advocates of con-
tractual price discrimination, it is important to recall, first, that
Area 2 in Figure A represents not only lost incentives to copyright
owners, but also the utility realized by more affluent users. Because
we are using a model derived from commodity markets, we are con-
ditioned to think of consumer surplus as unproductive. Whether or
not that makes sense for ordinary consumer goods, it makes much
less sense as applied to the production and consumption of informa-
tion products, which have strong public good characteristics and
may generate significant positive externalities. 21 At least some of
the heightened utility realized by affluent or high-value users will
come from transformative reuses that create additional social wel-
fare benefits-again, benefits that Figure A does not capture.
Similarly, lower-income individuals who gain access to works
through libraries and second-hand markets also may become crea-
tors. Figure A reflects neither the increased utility realized by those
individuals nor the benefits realized by society generally. Finally,
uncaptured consumer surplus also may induce its beneficiaries to
purchase more copyrighted works than they might if forced to pay
higher prices for each work, which in turn may result in the crea-
tion of new works that are informed by a broader, richer cross-
section of our cultural capital.
In short, the distribution patterns generated by the tradi-
tional copyright framework are not necessarily less efficient than
the new patterns that contractual price discrimination would cre-
21.A public good is a good that can be consumed without depletion (non-rivalrous consump-
tion) and that can be withheld from nonpaying beneficiaries only at prohibitive cost (non-
excludability). See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 40-41 (2d ed. 1997).
A positive externality is a benefit or gain that is not appropriated by the party or parties whose
activities generated it. Seeid. at 38-40, 139-46 (defining externalities as costs or benefits arising
from a market exchange that spill over onto third parties); ANDREAS A. PAPANDREOU,
EXTERNALITY AND INSTITUTIONS 13-68 (1994) (analyzing and synthesizing leading approaches to
defining and identifying externalities). Such benefits may accrue either to other private parties
or to society generally. See Benjamin J. Bates, Information as an Economic Good& Sources of
Individual and Social Value, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INFORMATION 76, 82-85 (Vincent
Mosco & Janet Wasko eds., 1988). On the positive social externalities generated by information
goods, see C. Edwin Baker, Giving the Audience What It Wants, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 311, 350-66
(1997); Cohen, supra note 20, at 542-51; Ezra J. Mishan, The Effects of Externalities on Individ-
ual Choice, 1 INTL. REV. L. & ECON. 97, 104-05 (1981); cf. William W. Fisher III, Reconstructing
the Fair Use Doctrine, 101 HARv. L. REV. 1661, 1769-74 (1988) (identifying education, public
debate, cultural diversity, and public access to information as among the social benefits produced
by copyrighted works).
2000] 1807
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ate. To a substantial degree, efficiency (or inefficiency) is in the eye
of the beholder. 22 Certainly, the patterns of distribution and access
produced by a contractual price discrimination regime would be dif-
ferent than those produced currently. The relevant question, then,
is whether the mix of "progress" produced under the two regimes
would be different, and if so how.
Advocates of the contractual price discrimination model ar-
gue that from an institutional perspective, more complete markets
in contractual restrictions might, and probably will, work more ef-
fectively than imperfect copyright monopolies to advance the dual
goals of copyright. In part, as I have argued elsewhere, this is a
normative claim about the meaning and importance of property
rights.28 In part, though, it is a claim about the quantitative superi-
ority of one rule system over another (along both productive and
distributive dimensions)-and so, implicitly, about the value-
neutrality of institutional choices with respect to qualitative meas-
ures of progress. Part III considers the qualitative dimension of this
latter claim.
III. COPYRIGHT AND THE QUALITY OF "PROGRESS"
The explicit premise of the contractual price Idiscrimination
model is quantitative: Its adherents claim there will be more access
and more creative output with contractual price discrimination
than without it. The implicit premise is (necessarily) either that the
shift in rules would be value-neutral as to quality-that is, that
greater control would produce more of the same sorts of progress-
or, alternatively, that because copyright law strives for value-
neutrality, it does not matter whether the sorts of progress pro-
duced under old and new rules are the same or different. Here, I
argue that even if it worked perfectly, the contractual price dis-
crimination model would be incapable of producing the same kinds
and variety of progress, and distributing the same variety of crea-
22.Cf. DANIEL W. BROMLEY, ECONOMIC INTERESTS AND INSTITUTIONS: THE CONCEPTUAL
FOUNDATIONS OF PUBLIC POLICY 137-39, 175-83 (1989) ('Judgments about social efficiency re-
quire that analysis be conducted against the backdrop of some social welfare function and its
implicit social utility function."); C. Edwin Baker, The Ideology of the Economic Analysis of Law,
5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 3, 6-7, 28-31 (1975) (arguing that "human satisfaction" is a function of dis-
tributive as well as efficiency considerations); Pierre Schlag, The Problem of Transaction Costs,
62 S. CAL. L. REV. 1661, 1685 (1989) (arguing that normative judgments drive the choice to
characterize particular costs as (wasteful) transaction costs rather than as necessary production
costs).
23.See Cohen, supra note 20, at 480-514.
1808 [Vol. 53:6:1799
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tive materials as widely, as the traditional copyright framework. I
argue, further, that these changes would matter. The shift to a re-
gime of contractual restrictions on access and use will have impor-
tant, and undesirable, substantive consequences for copyright's
progress project. 24
With respect to the creative progress criterion, the important
question is whether contractual price discrimination will favor cer-
tain types of improvements, or certain types of new creation, over
others. As noted above, the contractual price discrimination model
predicts that rational copyright owners will license improvements
at prevailing market rates. This, of course, is the way that many
improvements are produced now. Many other improvements, how-
ever, do not require licenses. Some of these improvements involve
fair use of copyrighted expression; other improvements, and much
new creation, involve use of ideas and other uncopyrightable inputs.
The shift to a pure licensing model raises questions about the con-
tinuing viability of these sorts of activities.
The prediction that granting increased control to copyright
owners will promote the efficient licensing of formerly uncontrolled
creation proves difficult to justify on a per-transaction basis. Even
if we assume that copyright owners are, on the whole, rational and
want to license improvements that will increase the value of their
works, they will face problems in identifying worthy improvers and
improvements. 25 It is difficult to predict which ideas will bear the
most promising creative fruit. For the same reason, would-be im-
provers who lack capital may have a hard time raising funds to pay
the going rate for their desired uses. In addition, bargaining be-
tween current and future creators may entail strategic behavior
and other significant transaction costs. 26
More important, licensing decisions designed to maximize
individual or private welfare may not maximize society's. 27 And
24.This Part summarizes the analysis set forth in Cohen, supra note 20; for commentary in a
similar vein, see Lemley, supra note 4; Lydia Pallas Loren, Redefining the Market Failure Ap-
proach to Fair Use in an Era of Copyright Permission Systems, 5 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 8-32
(1997); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J. 283,
308-36 (1996).
25.See Cohen, supra note 20, at 497-98 & n.129; cf. Lemley, supra note 4, at 1055-56 (noting
that uncertainty as to the nature of a proposed improvement may preclude an accurate assess-
ment of the gains from trade).
26.See Lemley, supra note 4, at 1048-65; Netanel, supra note 24, at 334.
27.See Cohen, supra note 20, at 497-502; cf. BROMLEY, supra note 22, at 175-83 (demon-
strating that "productive" or monetary efficiency is only one of the considerations that factor into
the determination of whether a particular rule or practice is socially efficient); PAPANDREOU,
supra note 21, at 225 ("[I]nstitutional change does not require efficiency gains to be initiated, it
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because judging the "value" of most cultural works is an inherently
subjective exercise, it is not clear that we want any one individual
or entity to control decisions about which uses of a work are valu-
able. It is worth noting that some of the most detailed arguments
about the importance of coordination, or stewardship, of improve-
ments have been made about computer software-technical subject
matter that has never fit comfortably within the copyright
scheme.28 Even for computer software, moreover, the rise of the
open source movement suggests that formal, centralized control is
not needed to ensure high performance and interoperability. 29
The answer to these objections offered by advocates of con-
tractual price discrimination is that the market will nonetheless
correct for individual instances of irrationality, misjudgment, and
shortsightedness. This assumption about the aggregate neutrality
of markets is a crucial conceptual underpinning of conventional le-
gal-economic arguments for market ordering of entitlements.30 In
fact, the assumption is at odds with the ways that information
markets actually work, and it is especially unlikely to hold under
contractual price discrimination.
requires gains to the initiators of change, which may or may not coincide with an overall increase
in wealth."); AMARTYA K. SEN, CHOICE, WELFARE AND MEASUREMENT 288-90 (1982).
28.See, e.g., Kenneth W. Dam, Some Economic Considerations in the Intellectual Property
Protection of Software, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 321, 352-54, 361-66 (1995); Douglas Lichtman, Prop-
erty Rights in Emerging Platform Technologies, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 615, 620-29 (2000); Ramsey
Hanna, Note, Misusing Antitrust. The Search for Functional Copyright Misuse Standards, 46
STAN. L. REV. 401, 432-35 (1994).
29.See PETER WAYNER, FREE FOR ALL: How LINUX AND THE FREE SOFTWARE MOVEMENT
UNDERCUT THE HIGH-TECH TITANS (2000). In theory, under existing copyright law, would-be
improvers are free to reuse the functional principles embodied in competitors' software. See Sega
Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1520-28 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that fair use doc-
trine excuses intermediate copying during the course of reverse engineering to discover other-
wise inaccessible functional principles); see also 17 U.S.C. § 1201(f)(1) (2000) (authorizing exemp-
tion from prohibitions relating to circumvention of technological protection devices for reverse
engineering to discover requisites for interoperability). In practice, however, the interplay be-
tween copyright and trade secret law raises barriers to entry to a sufficient degree that licensing
may be preferred.
30.More precisely, neoclassical law and economics and the branch of economic theory from
which it derives holds that absent significant transaction cost barriers, markets will order enti-
tlements in ways that maximize wealth, and that this is optimal. See, e.g., Harold Demsetz,
Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347, 349 (1967); Frank H. Easterbrook,
Intellectual Property Is Still Property, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLY 108 (1990); Edmund W. Kitch,
The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265 (1977); see generally
NICHOLAS MERCURO & STEVEN G. MEDEMA, ECONOMICS AND THE LAW: FROM POSNER TO POST-
MODERNISM 13-18, 57-60 (1997) (summarizing the tenets of "Chicago School" law and econom-
ics); Netanel, supra note 24, at 321-24 (describing neoclassically oriented theorists' commitment
to "legal marginalism'). As I shall discuss, both propositions are open to serious doubt.
HeinOnline -- 53 Vand. L. Rev.  1810 2000
COPYRIGHTAND THE PERFECT CURVE
First, considerable evidence suggests that real markets in
contractually encumbered information goods will not operate quite
as smoothly as the contractual price discrimination model predicts.
There are important questions about the balance of power between
providers and consumers of information goods that the conventional
economic wisdom does not fully address. An imbalance may result
if a particular content provider has a dominant market share, or a
unique and nonsubstitutable work. Although a copyright does not
necessarily guarantee market power, many information goods lack
perfectly fungible substitutes.3 1 Even absent a commanding market
share, market power may inhere in standard-form terms that are
widely adopted within an industry.32 Such terms aie increasingly
common in information markets, and despite considerable evidence
that information consumers want greater freedom, the major copy-
right owners do not seem to be competing among themselves to of-
fer less restrictive terms.33
The contractual price discrimination model destabilizes the
argument from markets still further. The ability to price discrimi-
nate requires at least one of the kinds of market power discussed
above.3 4 In particular, contractual price discrimination presumes at
31.See Cohen, supra note 20, at 520-22 (discussing substitutability of information goods); cf.
Meurer, supra note 6, at 870 (speculating that copyright may confer sufficient market power to
enable price discrimination).
32.See Victor P. Goldberg, Institutional Change and the Quasi-Invisible Hand, 17 J.L. &
ECON. 461, 474-79, 484-88 (1974) (arguing that rulemaking via standard form provisions gives
the upper hand to those entities that organize most efficiently in markets-namely, private
firms).
33.See Cohen, supra note 20, at 521-30 (discussing examples). The controversy over digital
music vividly illustrates this dynamic. Despite enormous consumer demand for a degree of un-
restricted personal copying, the recording industry adamantly refuses to develop or license busi-
ness models that would meet this demand. Instead, the Recording Industry Association of
America is pursuing both an aggressive litigation strategy and the Secure Digital Music Initia-
tive, which it hopes will supply perfect metering capability for digital music files. See UMG
Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 349, 353 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (granting summary
judgment for plaintiffs on fair use defense asserted by supplier of technology designed to allow
owners of sound recordings the ability to access them via the Internet from any computer); A&M
Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., No. C 99-5183, 2000 WL 1009483, at *7 (N.D. Cal. July 26, 2000)
(enjoining technology designed to allow network users to locate and share files directly without
need for a centralized index or fie server), stay granted, No. 00-16401, 00-16403, 2000 WL
1055915 (9th Cir. July 28, 2000); Ryan S. Henriquez, Facing the Music on the InterneL Identify-
ing Divergent Strategies for Different Segments of the Music Industry in Approaching Digital
Distribution, 7 UCLA EN'r. L. REV. 57, 86-98 (1999). The Uniform Computer and Information
Transactions Act, recently approved by the National Council of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws and already adopted in several states, would make it even easier for software manufactur-
ers and database proprietors to impose similar restrictions. See Cem Kaner, Why You Should
Oppose UCITA, COMPUTER LAw., May 2000, at 20, 21-22.
34.See Meurer, supra note 6, at 870; see also Cohen, supra note 20, at 529-30 (discussing the
market power that arises from industry standard-form restrictions and corresponding techno-
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least sufficient power to impose standard restrictions on redistribu-
tion and reuse. Market power, in turn, decreases the likelihood that
irrational, misguided, or rationally self-centered but socially ineffi-
cient licensing decisions will be subject to market correction. In this
respect, the contractual price discrimination model rests on a logi-
cal impossibility. As a result, it is unlikely to foster the sort of com-
petition that its adherents claim is necessary for it to work.
There is a more fundamental objection to the contractual
price discrimination model's progress claims, however. Basic eco-
nomic theory suggests that rules that allow owners to appropriate
more of the benefits that their works generate, and require im-
provers to internalize more of their costs, will systematically disfa-
vor certain types of creation and. improvement. In particular, cen-
tralization of access control through more complete entitlements
will result in the underproduction of information goods that gener-
ate significant public benefit.3 5 Creators of these works cannot ap-
propriate all of the value that they create, and so will tend to un-
dervalue their uses of preexisting works.3 6 For many of these crea-
tors, the profit motive is secondary; even so, these individuals face
considerable monetary disincentives. 37 Currently, limitations on
copyright and institutions (such as libraries) that provide subsi-
dized access to creative and informational works mitigate this
problem. It is reasonable to predict that under contractual price
logical restrictions); Julie E. Cohen, Copyright and the Jurisprudence of Self-Help, 13 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 1089, 1126-27 (1998) (same). In a recent paper, Michael Levine argues that price
discrimination "very often occur[s] in competitive markets as a way of recovering costs common
to producing more than one unit of a good or service. In these instances, price discrimination is
simply a way of distributing the burden of common costs among customers in the way which
permits the most efficient output from any given set of inputs." Michael E. Levine, Price Dis-
crimination Without Market Power, Harvard John M. Olin Discussion Paper No. 276, at 4 (Feb.
2000). However, Levine is concerned solely with antitrust-style market power, and does not
address industry power to set the standard terms that make price discrimination stick. See
supra note 32.
35.See Cohen, supra note 20, at 542-51, Lemley, supra note 4, at 1056-58; Loren, supra note
24, at 49-56.
36.See Cohen, supra note 20, at 547; Lemley, supra note 4, at 1056; Loren, supra note 24, at
51-53.
37.See, e.g., Princeton Univ. Press v. Michigan Document Servs., 99 F.3d 1381, 1410 (6th
Cir. 1996) (en banc) (Ryan, J., dissenting) (summarizing testimony of numerous academic
authors "that they write for professional and personal reasons" and "that the receipt of immedi-
ate monetary compensation such as a share of licensing fees is not their primary incentive"); cf.
John Kay, The Economics of Intellectual Property Rights, 13 INT'L. REV. L. & ECON. 337, 345-46
(1993) (suggesting that in many cases the monetary value of a copyrighted work will bear no
relation either to the "moral worth" of the work or to the incentives that led the author to create
it).
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discrimination, the increased cost of inputs will deter at least some
of these creators from proceeding. 38
A contractual price discrimination regime also will not pro-
duce as great a variety of works as a system of less perfect control.
C. Edwin Baker's study of the newspaper business demonstrates
that an advertising-driven business model leads inexorably to mo-
nopoly provision of homogenized content, as information providers
seek simultaneously to please their advertisers and appeal to the
broadest possible customer base.3 9 Even in non-advertising-driven
media markets, standardization of content may follow from the
adoption of a particular business model. As Yochai Benkler shows,
an information provider that amasses and reuses proprietary con-
tent can reduce its costs, and thus, over time, crowd out competitors
who must create wholly new content and/or license their inputs
from others.40
These changes in the nature of progress also should inform
consideration of how well a contractual price discrimination regime
would serve copyright's distributional goals. As noted above, under
a contractual price discrimination regime, information goods will be
available more widely and at lower prices. In all likelihood, how-
ever, the quality of what is available will be different. Works of-
fered at low prices for restricted use will be far more standardized,
and will contain a lower proportion of the sort of "shared public
benefit" content described above.
Speaking normatively now, these are changes that matter.
Shared information goods are profoundly constitutive of social
identity. It is one thing to say that the standard for copyright
protection should not be elitist; it is quite another to say that
38.See Cohen, supra note 20, at 547 (noting, further, that "users may be disinclined (or sim-
ply unable) to pass increased license fees through to their customer base because of limitations
imposed by other institutional and social values").
39.See C. EDWIN BAKER, ADVERTISING AND A DEMOCRATIC PRESS (1994); see also BEN H.
BAGDIKIAN, THE MEDIA MONOPOLY (5th ed. 1997) (documenting increasing consolidation of the
major copyright industries); BENJAMIN R. BARBER, JIHAD VS. MCWORLD 137-48 (1995) (same);
EDWARD HERMAN & NOAM CHOMSKY, MANUFACTURING CONSENT: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
THE MASS MEDIA 3-14 (1988) (same); Netanel, supra note 24, at 333 (observing that sectors of the
media with significant concentration favor expression likely to appeal to large audiences).
40.See Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use: First Amendment Constraints on En-
closure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 354, 402, 406-08 (1999) [hereinafter Benkler,
Free as the Air]; Yochai Benkler, Intellectual Property and the Organization of Information Pro-
duction 24, 29-33 (July 1999) (working paper) [hereinafter Benkler, Organization of Information
Production], available at http://www.law.nyu.edu/benklery/Ipec/pdf. Michael Madison argues
that the move to digital distribution systems also will eliminate the diversity of textures and
experiences that the less restrictive architecture of copyright law has fostered. See Michael J.
Madison, Complexity and Copyright in Contradiction, 18 CARDozo ARTS & ENT. L.J. 125, 140-44
(2000).
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copyright entitlements must be reshaped in ways that
systematically undervalue scholarship and avant-garde artistic and
cultural expression. 41 Similarly, while it is both right and fair to
argue that copyright should seek to promote the widest possible
dissemination of knowledge, it defies common sense to insist that
this aspiration can be satisfied by substituting a diet of
standardized, mass-produced "infotainment" for the broader
diversity of content that fair use and freely accessible public
libraries guarantee. 42 Success in the mass market is not, and never
has been, the only way our culture measures value. These are not
the sorts of changes, and this is not the sort of "progress," that
copyright law should seek to promote.
The problem confronting copyright law in the digital era may
now be restated using a very different formulation than that offered
by advocates of contractual price discrimination: Given increasing
market pressures for greater control over access to and use of copy-
righted works, how can we preserve or replace the important social
benefits generated by areas 2 and 3 under the demand curve in
Figure A-in other words, the benefits generated by a system of
incomplete controls?43 Part IV considers this question and explores
the role that economic modeling might play in answering it.
IV. MODELING UNPREDICTABILITY
If the entitlement structures of copyright are not value-
neutral, and if limitations on copyright scope play an important role
in producing the kinds of progress we want, that does not quite end
41.We tend to forget that in Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., Justice Holmes cau-
tioned against both sorts of errors:
It would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the law to con-
stitute themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations .... At the
one extreme some works of genius would be sure to miss appreciation. Their
very novelty would make them repulsive until the public had learned the new
language in which their author spoke. It may be more than doubted, for in-
stance, whether the etchings of Goya or the paintings of Manet would have been
sure of protection when seen for the first time. At the other end, copyright
would be denied to pictures which appealed to a public less educated than the
judge.
Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251-52 (1902).
42.See BABER, supra note 39, at 59-87 (coining the term to describe this sort of content).
43.Alternatively, government could subsidize the creation of works designed to benefit the
public, and in some cases it does. But exclusive reliance on government subsidies to generate
socially valued content is not the sort of solution that comports with our constitutional tradition
of protecting information production from government oversight. See generally Netanel, su-
pra note 24, at 352-59 (arguing that copyright serves the structural function of maintaining this
separation).
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the matter. Practically speaking, efforts at contractual price dis-
crimination are here to stay, driven both by profit incentives and by
the relative ease of implementation via digital distribution tech-
nologies. Important questions remain about how copyright law
should respond to these efforts. Can the contractual price discrimi-
nation model be adapted to ensure socially beneficial uses, as at
least one of its advocates argues? Or does the key to copyright's fu-
ture lie, instead, in its past? The answers to these questions high-
light a fundamental tension inherent in efforts to construct eco-
nomic models of the creative process, and suggest new directions for
economic research into the conditions likely to foster ongoing, self-
sustaining creativity within society.
William Fisher argues that the contractual price discrimina-
tion model can be adapted to preserve the important public benefits
that the traditional copyright framework generates. Under Fisher's
proposal, we would accept the stronger entitlements demanded by
the contractual price discrimination model, but would impose a se-
ries of "compulsory terms" designed to preserve the public benefits
of specified types of access and/or use."4 In this way, he argues, the
price discrimination model can provide for important public policy
exceptions while at the same time furthering both distributive jus-
tice and incentive-related goals.
Fisher's proposal is a serious effort to preserve the public
benefits generated by the traditional framework, and deserves seri-
ous consideration. In particular, if that is the solution that best ac-
commodates emerging market practices, then those who favor a
system more closely resembling traditional copyright law need to
explain why a regime of complete entitlements plus compulsory
limitations is not functionally equivalent to a regime of incomplete
entitlements. Clearly, one cannot distinguish the two by noting
simply that the boundary between entitlement and exceptions will
require judicial interpretation; this would be the case under either
regime. There are, however, two weightier differences.
The first objection to Fisher's proposal is a practical one: The
proposal takes insufficient account of the effects on individuals'
abilities to make privileged uses of protected works. This is par-
ticularly true in cases where the more complete entitlements of the
contractual price discrimination model are enforced by technical
protection systems.45 Self-enforcing restrictions to which exceptions
44.Fisher, supra note 5, at 1241-51; see also Merges, End of Friction, supra note 11, at 134-35
(suggesting a similar approach).
45.See Cohen, supra note 34, at 1140-42.
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exist only in theory, or as defenses to a breach of contract suit, will
constrain individual behavior to a much greater degree.
The second defect in Fisher's proposal is conceptual, and lies
in the presumption that access and use restrictions can be treated
independently of one another. Fisher argues that his proposal will
allow the law to recognize a more expansive set of privileges for
"transformative" uses than the current fair use doctrine accommo-
dates. We can afford to do so without sacrificing creation incentives,
he says, if we balance these exceptions with stricter restrictions on
transfer and reuse of copyrighted content. 46 But what if one cannot
so neatly separate the two?
At the very least, the suggestion that transformative use
privileges can be divorced from copyright limitations that allow
casual, unmonitored access to and sharing of information rests on
some surprising and rather elitist presumptions. To say that access
and reuse privileges may be granted separately presumes an ability
to predict who will create. And, because as a practical matter reuse
restrictions will burden lower-income users most heavily, it pre-
sumes that future creators are less likely to come from this class.47
Finally, it presumes that those who will not create immediately will
not create at all, and will not use the information they have ac-
quired to produce any other social benefit.
It is at least as likely that access and transformative reuse
are two sides of the same coin-that creativity cannot be predicted
ex ante; that the nature of the creative process requires adventi-
tious access and reuse; that the rich are not always more creative
than the poor; and that the temporal and causal connections be-
tween access and reuse are not always so close. 8 If so, then even
Fisher's modified contractual price discrimination model is flawed
both descriptively and prescriptively. The imperfect correspondence
46.See Fisher, supra note 5, at 1251.
47.Fisher's suggestion that we might consider establishing a compulsory privilege for public
library users comes closest to recognizing this problem. See id. (framing the question of library
access as a distributive justice issue).
48.For a suggestive anecdote, see Dennis Cass, Let's Go: Silicon Valley!, HARPER'S, July 2000,
at 59, 66 (describing an interview with David Hecht, a scientist at the Xerox Palo Alto Research
Center):
When I comment on his art books he lets a smile creep across his face and
starts talking in a disjointed way about how he saw Sunday in the Park with
George in 1984, which got him thinking about Seurat, which triggered a revela-
tion about how to create pictures with backward and forward slashes he calls
glyphs. I ask him if there is a correlation between art and technology. "Crea-
tive people are good at creating surprises," he says, slurring his speech out of
shyness. "And it doesn't matter if you're creating with a brush or with equa-
tions."
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between pricing and value to consumers is a vital structural under-
pinning of the copyright system.
For the purposes of this Essay, though, whether I am right is
beside the point. It is enough that there is doubt. If we cannot say
with certainty which characterization of the creative process is the
right one, we do not know enough about how the creative process
works to attempt to formulate economic prescriptions for improving
it.
The point underscores a deeper pitfall in the use of economic
modeling to solve intellectual property problems. The premise of
economic analysis is that it is possible to model assumptions and
predict outcomes. Responsible economists acknowledge that some
features of markets cannot readily be modeled or predicted. That is
not necessarily a reason to forego modeling, particularly if the com-
plex aspects are peripheral. Where complexity is central, however,
and models overly reductionist, economic modeling may do more
harm than good. It may cause harm, in particular, if it causes us to
focus on and emphasize those aspects of the process that are least
important-to overlook what is most vital in favor of what is easier
to describe or model.
The particular brand of economic analysis practiced within
the legal academy compounds this error. Conventional law and eco-
nomics has overwhelmingly focused on generating static pictures of
the demand and distribution curves for isolated goods at a particu-
lar point in time. As applied to information goods, this approach is
especially perverse. Like a medieval mapmaker skirting the
boundaries of terra incognita, it concentrates on the familiar and
visible-transactions! licensing revenues!-and evinces little curi-
osity about the rest and its relation to the dynamic, irreducible
whole. In place of the proverbial dragons, it assumes a benign uni-
verse-the hypothetical self-ordering market-as background, and
thus avoids the difficulty of modeling the other complex systems
that surround information production and use.
Second-generation research in the law and economics of in-
tellectual property rights has begun to move beyond this approach.
Scholars like Marshall Van Alstyne are attempting to model the
ways in which exposure to information shapes demand for addi-
tional information.49 Other work has focused on understanding the
ways in which the design of legal and market institutions, and the
resulting constraints on access to and use of information resources,
49.See Marshall Van Alstyne, A Proposal for Valuing Information and Instrumental Goods
(working paper 2000) (on file with author).
181720001
HeinOnline -- 53 Vand. L. Rev.  1817 2000
VANDERBILT LAWREVIEW
affect further production.50 As discussed above, closer attention to
the dynamics of information markets has shown that market-based
ordering can result in inflexible standardization that rivals any-
thing the public sector can produce. This work suggests that the
institutional parameters of our information markets may need to be
rethought. The question is not whether "public" or "private" order-
ing is better, but rather what combination of public and private or-
dering will produce the socially optimal result. Finally, scholarship
in copyright and allied fields is beginning to marry the insights of
economics with those of post-modern and critical information the-
ory, which focus on how information constructs methodology and
ideology, and with work in cognitive theory and philosophy of sci-
ence that explores the ways in which information systems and
technologies shape perceptions of reality.51 These preliminary ef-
forts to map the dynamics of information exchange and their rela-
tion to institutional variables provide a foundation upon which to
build.
The problems that economic modeling of intellectual prop-
erty rights must solve, in short, are very different from the ones
posited by advocates of contractual price discrimination. What is
missing from the conventional economic wisdom about property
rights in general and intellectual property rights in particular is a
vocabulary for apprehending the link between incomplete control
and productivity, between "leaky" entitlements and public welfare,
between chaos and creative ferment. 52 The fact that we cannot iden-
50.See Benkler, Free as the Air, supra note 40; Benkler, Organization of Information Produc-
tion, supra note 40; Cohen, supra note 20; Niva Elkin-Koren, Turning Culture into a Market for
Consumer Goods (working paper 2000) (on file with author).
51.See JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFTWARE, AND SPLEENS: LAW AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF
THE INFORMATION SOCIETY 35-60 (1996); Dan L. Burk, Patenting Speech, 79 TEX. L. REV. (forth-
coming 2000); Julie E. Cohen, A Right to Read Anonymously: A Closer Look at "Copyright Man-
agement" in Cyberspace, 28 CONN. L. REV. 981, 1004-07 (1996); Niva Elkin-Koren, Copyright
Law and Social Dialogue on the Information Superhighway: The Case Against Copyright Liabil-
ity of Bulletin Board Operators, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 346, 391-401 (1995); Netanel,
supra note 24, at 332-33; cf. J. M. BALKIN, CULTURAL SOFTWARE: A THEORY OF IDEOLOGY 23-97
(1998) (exploring the gradual evolution of ideas and beliefs within society); James Boyle, Fou-
cault in Cyberspace Surveillance, Sovereignty, and Hardwired Censors, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 177,
184-88 (1997) (discussing the potential for digital information technologies to control and moni-
tor information use); Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject as
Object, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1373, 1396-98, 1404-08 (2000) (discussing the use of personal identify-
ing information to shape desire, opportunity, and potentially behavior).
52.In contrast, the common law of property achieves an intuitive, equitable recognition of the
role that limited entitlements can play in maximizing society's welfare. As Carol Rose demon-
strates, the common law historically recognized a species of "limited common property" in roads
and waterways that enabled access to, and thus more efficient exploitation of, the surrounding
private property. See generally Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce,
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tify improvers or predict improvements in advance is not a weak-
ness to be minimized or ignored, but a strength to be celebrated. We
need an economic syntax that acknowledges and accommodates the
essentially unpredictable nature of creativity, and an economic
model that focuses on creating the conditions for random or fortui-
tous access to copyrighted content-in other words, on preserving
"open spaces" under the copyright demand curve. Promising work
on these problems has begun to supply the foundation; what is
needed is to acknowledge the goal and the methodological chal-
lenges it poses.
V. CONCLUSION
Copyright's progress mandate demands that we develop a
system of rights and rules to foster creativity. It does not tell us
how. Particularly in its more sophisticated incarnations, the con-
tractual price discrimination model is a serious, good-faith effort to
optimize copyright for the digital age. But the model stumbles, fa-
tally, in its failure to understand the phenomenon upon which it
seeks to improve.
Before we can construct a reliable system of entitlements
and public policy exceptions to promote the twin goals of progress
and access, we must learn to understand and describe creative pro-
cesses more accurately. We need to understand how people get
ideas, and how ideas migrate and transform within society. And we
must learn how to design open spaces-zones of unpredictability
within and around the predictable contours of rights and rules.
Only then can we proceed to construct a regime that will optimize
for those aspects of the creative process that are most valuable. In
the end, we may well find that that regime bears a closer resem-
blance to the copyright regime we already have.
and Inherently Public Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711 (1986). Access that is only partially
regulated by law, and partially regulated, as well, by community norms of fair play and accept-
able behavior, is an integral part of a well-functioning, usable system of property rights. The
analysis here suggests that similar principles apply to property rights in intangibles, although
the geography of exploitation is different.
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